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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TAXATION
OF COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES RENDERED
ROY A. WENTZQ
Tax Counselor, E. I. duPont de Nomours & Company
The impact of taxation on management decisions has been brought
forcefully to the attention of the general public recently in an article that
was most critical of the extent to which business matters are tailored to
accomplish a favorable tax rcsult.) There is probably no other area of
industry concern where the tax consequences play a more important part
than in considering methods of paying compensation. An inordinate amount
of time is being spent by industry tax experts in attempting to devise
means for ameliorating the effects of the high progressive surtax rates.
Many of the recent corporate resolutions authorizing payments to employee's
beneficiaries owe their strange construction to an attempt to preserve a
tax deduction for the payor of what is hoped will be treated as a non-taxable
gift to the payee. Pension plans are now designed to comply with specific
provisions of the tax law and many even permit a lump sum withdrawal
in one year of all credits solely to obtain a capital gains privilege for
participants. Disability wage plans are being subjected to a thorough review
with an eye toward the pertinent provisions of the significant tax law
change in 1954.
The tax consequences to employees may make or break any compensa-
tion plan which, from solely a business standpoint, seems desirable. If
the cost of a plan to a company is fixed, the mcthod of payment and the
conditions attached to receipt should be set up so that the best net of
tax result will be obtained for the employees. These factors require that
corporate tax counsel devote considerable time and study to the taxation
of individuals. For that reason a review of current developments with
respect to the taxation of various types of compensation payments should
be appropriate in a symposium devoted to the tax problems of industry.
I. INCENTIVE PLANS
rhc earlier compensation plans designed to increase employe's incentive,
particularly of key management, date back to the early 1900's.? Payment
of compensation in stock of the employer and profit-sharing were the
principal devices employed. Thc standard stock bonus plan provided for
*This article is not to be considered the official view of the company with whom
the author is associated.
1. Hawley, Our Tax Laws Make Us Dishonest, Sat. Eve. Post, July 14, 1956, p. 27.
2. The present bonus plan of E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company has been
continuously in operation since 1904. United States Steel Corp. adopted an incentive
plan in 1902. See BAKER, EXECUTIVE SALARIES AND BONUS PLANS 193-95 (1938).
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an award in stock for each year with the amount based on performance
and profits of the company. The stock was deliverable over a period of
time with provisions for forfeiture on termination of service prior to delivery.
Early profit-sharing plans usually provided for a formula distribution of
profits to key personnel who were entitled to specified percentages. Many
of these plans were originally adopted at a time when little or no con-
sideration needed to be given to tax matters. Now many incentive plans
have been so amended and revised that they may be more accurately
characterized as tax minimization plans?
A. Stock Bonus
Stock bonus plans have been rendered almost useless as a means of
creating a substantial stock interest for management.4 This is because
an employee must sell stock received as compensation in order to pay tax
on the fair market value of the sock at time of receipt. Employers just
cannot make up the tax and attempts to do so often result in total com-
pensation which approaches recognized maximums.
The old line stock bonus plan which envisions the award of stock
to employees in one year, followed by delivery in subsequent years on an
earning out basis, affords no unusual tax problems so long as each employee's
interest in an award is forfeitable and no accrual or payment is made by
the employer prior to the time of actual delivery of the stock, The employee
realizes taxable income based on the fair market value of the stock at time
of receipt. The employer obtains a tax deduction for the same amount
in the year when it is paid or accrued.0 Amounts which are paid to the
employees as dividends on awarded stock are deductible by the employer
as compensation?
The use of treasury stock under such plans or under any plan of
compensation will not result in gain or loss to the Company under final
3. The principal means of minimizing tax is to defer the receipt of benefits
to post employment years when the effective tax rate will be lower. Increased personal
and corporate taxation has been found to be one of the most important factors in
the growth among large corporations of deferred-type compensation plans. HALL,
ExECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND RETIREMENT PLANS 55 (1951).
4. Wentz, Remedying the Effect of Taxation on Management Ownarship of
Corporate Stock, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 442 (1953).
5. The Internal Revenue Service holds that each re imbursement of tax is itself
taxable income. Mini. 6779, 1952-1 Curu. BULL. 8 and I.R.-Mim. 51, 1952-2 Cum.
BULL. 65. In Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 907 (Ct.
Clms. 1956) it was held that only the first reimbursement of tax was taxable. The basis
for the holding is not clear because of a 9uestion of discrimination against the taxpayer
involved by reason of the Commissioners retroactive application of the above cited
mimeographs.
6. If payments are nmde under a plan deferring the receipt of compensation,
the deduction cannot be taken prior to the year of actual payment even though liability
may accrue in an earlier year. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 404(a)(5). In order to
be deductible at all, such payments must meet the 'reasonableness" test of § 162.
See R. J. Rdynolds Tobacco Co., 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 810 (1956).
7. United States Steel Corp., 2 T .-430 (1943).
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regulations promulgated by the Treasury.8 For years prior to 1954, the
taxability of gain or deductibility of loss on treasury stock paid for services
rendered or sold to employees may be a debated point. Applicable regu-
lations provided that a corporation realized gain or loss on disposition of
treasury stock if it thereby was dealing in its shares as it would the shares
of another corporation. The Internal Revenue Service for a long time held
that such was the case in any situation where stock was disposed of for a
purpose other than to readjust capital. 10
The Supreme Court refused to apply the rule so broadly in U.S. v.
Anderson, Clayton and Co." While that case involved a formal sale of
stock to employees, a principle which would seem to be equally applicable
to compensation was laid down. The Supreme Court said that where a
transaction is limited to a wholly intracorporate purpose, with no element
of speculation or gain to be derived from dealing in its shares, the corpo-
ration is not dealing in its shares as it would in the shares of another cor-
poration.
In enacting the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Congress completely
disowned the dealing in its own shares test.1 2 Under Sec. 1032, a company
realizes no gain or loss on transfer of its own shares for money or other
property. Despite this, the Treasury proposed regulations which provided
that gain or loss would be recognized where treasury stock was paid for
services rendered if the transfer involved dealing in the payer's shares as
it would in the stock of another company.' 3 After considerable protest this
provision was dropped completely and final regulations now specifically
provide that a transfer of treasury stock to employees as compensation is
a tax-free disposition under Section 1032.
A recent court opinion dealing with two taxpayers who were found
to have received non-taxable gifts of stock transferred to them by the
majority stockholders of a corporation is of interest.' 4 rhe peculiar facts
of that case may not be duplicated, but the ramifications of the holding
should not be ignored. The court of appeals does not even discuss the
reasons for the "gifts" which the lower court had found to be com-
8. U.S. Treas. Regs. 118, Sec. 1.1032-1(a).
9. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-15(b) (1953).
10. The Tax Court determined the tax consequences by reference to the motive
for the disposition. The Timkin-Detroit Axle Co., 21 T.C. 769 (1954). However,
the Courts of Appeal consistently reversed and agreed with the Commissioner that
the disposition of shares which were not actually retired and reissued was taxable
except in the ease of capital readjustment. Commissioner v. Landers Corp., 210 F.2d
188 (6th Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. H. V. Porter & Co., 187 F.2d 939 (3rd Cir.
1951); Commissioner v. Rollins Burdick Hunter Co., 174 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1949);
Commissioner v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborne, Inc., 171 F.2d 474 (2d Gir. 1949);
See Fager, Watch Out For Treasury Stock, 27 TAXEs 719 (1949).
11. 350 U.S. 55 (1955).
12. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 426 (1954).
13. Proposed Rule Making, 20 Fed. Reg. _(1956) Sec. 1.1032-1(b). See Car-
lisle, Treasury Stock and Sec. 1032, 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 558 (1955).
14. Neville v. Brodericl-, 235 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1956-).-
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pcisatory.' 5  Rather, it stresses the constant contemipcjraneous references
to the transfers as gifts and the failure of the payors to claim tax deductions
as business expenses. There is, of course, a legal presumption that the
transfer of stock or cash to an employee is for services rendered. 1 That
this presumption could be overcome by having the controlling shareholders
of a closely held corporation make the traiisfer in their names may be
surprising to the tax practitioner who has been so long schooled in the
"substance over form" doctrine. 17
B. Stock Options
The stock option is closely relatcd to the stock bonus as a method of
compensation and has long constituted a popular method of providing
incentive. Originally the Treasury Department ruled that an employee
realized taxable income based on the difference between the amount paid
for the stock and its fair market value only to the extent such difference
was in the nature of compensation for services rendered or to be rendered.' 8
Thus, where it could he shown that an option was granted to an employee
solely for the purpose of enabling him to acquire investment in the Company,
the purchase was said to be for proprietary purposes and no tax was
asserted.' 9 However, use of the employee stock option became very limited
subsequent to a Supreme Court decision in 1945,'0 which was followed by
the adoption of Treasury Regulations that held that, in any case where
the amount paid by an employee to his employer was less than the fair
market value of the property at time of purchase, the difference was taxable
compensation. -'" The courts refused to accept this amendment and con-
tinued to recognize a distinction between proprietary and compensatory
options.2
2
In Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 3 the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in a case involving the assertion of tax on the exercises of a stock option
15. Neville v. Broderick, 133 F. Supp. 716 (D.C. Kan., 1955).
16. Wallace v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1955); Willkie v. Com-
missioner, 127 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1942).
17. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
18. I.T. 3204, 1938-2 Cum. BULL. 126, Regs. 111, Sec. 29.22(a)-I (1945).
19. Geesemen, 38 BTA 258 (1938); And see Rossheim v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d
247 (3d Cir. 1937); Springford, 41 BTA 1001 (1940); Adams, 39 BTA 387 (1939);
Evans, 38 BTA 1406 (1938).
20. Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 695 (1945). There the court held that
an employee realized taxable income to the extent of the difference between option
price and fair mark-et value at time of exercise of the option. The court stated that
while, under some circumstances, the grant of anl option could be considered the taxable
event, the facts before the court indicated that compensation was contemplated from
the exercise of the option since the option, at time of grant, had no ascertainable
value. See note, Employee Stock Options and the Smith Case, I TAx L. REv. 225 (1945).
21. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-i (1943), as amended, T.D. 5507 Cm.
BULL. See Miller, The Treasury's Proposal To Tax Employee's Bargain Purchases:
T.D. 5507, 56 YALE L.J. 706 (1947).
22. Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 223 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1955); McNamara v. Com-
missioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Bradner, 209 F.2d 956 (6th
Cir. 1954). And see Note, The Non-Restricted Employee Stock Option-An Execu-
tive's Delight, 11 TAx L. REV. 179 (1956).
23. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
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vhich had been granted in 1944, and which both lower courts had found
was designcd to provide the employee with a proprietary interest in his
employer's business. rlle distinction between proprietary and compensatory
options was laid firmly to rest bv the court, which stated that there was
no statutory basis for such a test. The court found that the employee
received a substantial benefit prompted by his employer's desire to get
better work from him. The spread between option price and value at
date of exercise was held to be taxable compensation.
Some hope for an ultimate change in the peculiar method of applying
tax at the time an option is exercised, rather than at the time of grant,
was generated by the concurring and dissenting opinion in the Lo Bue case.
It is pointed out that, at the time of exercise of an option, the corporation
gives nothing to the employec but simply satisfies a previously created
legal obligation. The taxable event arising from the payment of compensa-
tion in the form of a stock option occurs when the employee's right to
exercise becomes unconditional. It is then, in the view of at least two
Justices of the Supreme Court, that compensation is realized to the extent
of the value of the option." While Justice Black, speaking for the majority,
did reiterate a prior statement in the Smith case that the value of an option
could, in some circumstances, be taxable at the time of grant, he relies
simply on prior Treasury practice which had been approved in the Smith
case and the adoption by Congress of the samc standard for the measure-
ment of gains in enacting the restricted stock option provisions under which
tax may apply at the time of exercise rather than at the time of grant
of the option.
The amendment to allow special tax treatment of options which qualify
as restricted stock options within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code
recognized the need to alleviate the Smith case rule in cases where employees
are granted options as incentive devices.- 4 (a) The exercise of a restricted
stock option does not result in taxable compensation to an employee. The
stock purchased is treated just as any other capital asset in his hands. 2l(b)
The only serious problem of current interest in this area may be en-
countered by the estate or heirs of employees who die without having
exercised a restricted stock option, which may be exercisable by the estate.
The value of such an option at date of death would be includible in gross
24. Id. at 805. In Palner v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63, 69 (1937) the Supreme
Court, in interpreting §§ 111, 112 and 113 of the Revenue Act of 1928 said: "It
follows that one does not subject himself to income tax by the mere purchase of
property, even if at less than its true value, and that taxable gain does not accrue to
him before he sells or otherwise disposes of it." See MACILL, TAXABLE INCOME 141
(1945). The opinion in the Smith case, note 19 supra, referred to the Palmer case
in passing, but made no attempt to distinguish it.
24(a). S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. 59 (1950).
24(b). INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 § 130A. For discussions of the provisions and
their genesis see Lyons, Employee Stock Options Under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51
COL, L. REV. 1 (1951) and Alexander, Employee Stock Options and the 1950 Revenue
Act, 6 TAx L. REV. 165 (1951).
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estate for federal estate tax purposes, but no income tax deduction would be
allowed for the estate tax paid on a restricted stock option which does not
involve the payment of income tax based on the spread between option price
and the fair market value at date of grant.25 North does the option acquire a
stepped-up basis because of passage through the estate. -'G Various organi-
zations have recommended the passage of remedial legislation27 but as
things now stand, taxpayers in high income brackets could realize an actual
fiTlancial loss from failure to exercise favorable options prior to death.,- ,
Tle Treasury has only recently issued proposed regulations dealing with
non-restricted stock options .21[a] An employee is held to realize taxable
compensation based on the difference between the amount paid and the
value of the property at the time of transfer of property pursuant to the
exercise of such an option. This rule applies to any option granted in
connection with employment even though it may have been granted by a
stockholder of the employer and irrespective of whether it was granted to
the employee. An unusual provision of these regulations provides that
where the transferee does not acquire "full ownership" of the property at
time of transfer, taxable compensation is realized only when full ownership
is acquired. These rules mean that an employee may be held taxable even
though lie acquires no interest in the property but if ownership is restricted,
tax may be postponed indefinitely even until retirement. The regulations
contemplate that these rules will apply even though the option may be
transferable. This would seem to be a complete rejection of the idea that
an employee can ever be held to realize income at the time of grant of
an option even though it may at that time have a readily ascertainable market
value.
Present day stock purchase plans do not involve the receipt of an
immediate direct economic benefit by the employee. Because of the rule
that the excess of fair market value of the stock purchased over the amount
paid constitutes taxable compensation to the employee, the advantage of
stock purchase plans is confined to the long-term installment payment
25. Where the restricted stock option price at date of grant was less than 95%
of the then fair market value of stock, taxable compensation is realized at time of
disposition of the stock or at death if the option has been exercised. It is only to
the extent of such income that a deduction can be taken for the estate tax paid because
of the inclusion of the value of the option in gross estate. INT. Rrv. Cone OF 1954, §
421(d)(6)(B) and 691 (c)(2)(B).
26. hIT. REV. CODr OF 1954 § 1014(d).
27. For example, see H.R. kep. No. 7193 (introduced by Rep. Simpson), 83rd
Cong., 1st Sess, (1953).
28. If an employee died prior to exercise of a 95% restricted stock option which
would allow his estate to buy stock worth $200 at time of death for $100, estate tax
would be payable on $100. If the estate exercised the option and sold the stock
before holding it for six months, it would have a short term capital gain of $100.
If the income tax and estate tax rates together exceed 100%, the estate will lose
money by exercising the option. Of course, failure to exercise will mean a loss of
the estate tax.
28(a). Proposed Rule Making 20 Fed. Reg. 8774,(1956) Sec.. 1421-6& -
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terms which are extended to employees and the repurchase obligation which
the employer assumes. These advantages may be substantial ones.
9
Some effort has been made in a limited number of cases to reduce the
sales price of stock to employees by encumbering the resale rights. Thus,
if an employee purchases stock which he cannot resell for a period of time,
he can contend that he realizes no income because the fair market value
of the stock, as restricted, is not in excess of the amount which a willing
buyer would pay for such stock. The Tax Court has held that restrictions
on resale so decrease the value of speculative stock that it has no ascertain-
able market value in excess of the amount paid at the time of resale to
the employee.30 It has further held that the employee realizes no taxable
income at the time the restrictions expire, since there is no taxable event
at that time.31
It is doubtful that the courts will adopt the value set by the parties
in cases where a marketable security is sold at a much reduced price which
cannot be established as its fair market value. However, if the stated price
can be supported by expert opinion evidence, no tax should result to the
employee.
C. Deferred Compensation
One of the most convincing signs of the effects of taxation on manage-
ment planning of compensation methods is found in the widespread pre-
occupation of industry tax experts with the problem of avoiding the
progressive surtax by deferring the receipt of compensation to post retirement
years. The reams of material which have been printed on the subject
probably outnumberd discussions of any other single tax topic. 32 The very
fact that, in the thinking of executives, deferred compensation arrangements
are regarded at all as incentives indicates the extent to which employees
are influenced by tax considerations.38
The tax problems of deferring compensation cannot be resolved without
legislation or final court action. The few fact situations which the Treasury
has argued before the courts have not involved the popular type of
29. See report of a speech by Henry Rothschild, Co-Author of Washington and
Rothschild, Compensating the Corporate Executive (1951), in which he shows how
much better off a particular executive could be under a stock purchase plan as
compared to a stock option. N. Y. Times, May 5, 1956, p. 23, col. 6.
30. Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1954) Acq. 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 2.
31. Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951).
32. For example, see Rudick, Introduction to Problems in Stock Options and
Deferred Compensation, N.Y.U. 14Tn INST. ON FED. TAX 1047 and articles following.
Long, Deferred Compensation for Executives, 24 TENN. L. REV. 285 (1956); Young,
Deferred Pay Plans-Qualified and Non-Qualified Plans, N.Y.U. 13Tm INST. ON FED.
TAX 457.
33. Two surveys of executive feelings about taxation were conducted by the Harvard
Business School. See SANDERS, EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON EXECUTIVES (1951); HALL,
EFFECTS OF TAXATION; EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AnD RETIREMENT PLANS (1951).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
deferral arrangcments.3 4 And yet, more and more companies are adopting
plans which have as their principal purpose a lower tax rate in the year
of receipt. Counsel throughout the country must be giving the green light
to such plans even though there would appear to be several areas of serious
doubt which could result in dire consequences to affected employees.
The more or less standard method of deferring compensation simply
provides that an amount determined by reference to services rendered
during the current year will be paid to the employee in annual installments
after retirement. Under the usual arrangement the deferred amounts will
be forfeitable on termination of employment prior to retirement. However,
after retirement, payments will be non-forfeitable except where the retired
employee engages in a competitive business, refuses to render consulting
services or some other like condition.
There is no indication that a non-qualified deferred compensation
arrangement of this type has either been specifically approved by the
Treasury Department or attacked in court. Tacit approval may be assumed
to some extent since Internal Revenue must have knowledge of the well
publicized plans which have been adopted, and yet no statement of policy
has been issued. This is not very reassuring, however. A case where the
right to future payments has 1ecome non-forfeitable may not yet have
arisen. Or, more seriously, the position of the Service may not have
crystallized even though it is known that the subject has been under active
consideration over a number of years. The absence of rulings is a clear
warning that action by Internal Revenue to attempt to tax the value of
deferred compensation prior to actual receipt will not require even a change
in policy.
The doctrine of constructive receipt could be applied to tax deferred
amounts prior to actual receipt only if it appeared that the employee had
a right to payment but elected to defer.,3 Most deferred compensation
arrangements, of course, give the employee only an implied choice. How-
ever, where annual paid compensation is reduced at the time the deferral
arrangement is entered into, a court may take the view that the employee
must have been consulted since it will be his tax which will be reduced
by the deferrmnent. This would be a clear extension of the constructive
receipt doctrine as it is presently applied, but it may be felt to be justified
34. See Howard Veit, 18 T.C. 809 (1947) and T.C.M. 919, CCH Tax Ct. Rep.
17240 (1949) and Commissioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953). A petition
was recently filed in the Tax Court in which it is indicated that Internal Revenue is
contending that the execution of a compensation agreement calling for periodic payments
over a number of years resulted in a taxable economic benefit. See Clyde W. and Dor-
othy A. Beckner, T.C. Docket 62095 filed May 2, 1956.
35. Under U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.42-2 (1943) income credited to the account,
or set apart for a taxpayer, and which could be drawn upon by him, was subject to
tax in the year so credited or set apart although it was not then reduced to possession.
See Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483 (lst Cir. 1948); note, 45 ILL. L. REv.
77 (1950).
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in order to prevent widespread avoidance of the progressive surtax system.
The Internal Revenue Service is not limited to this theory in attempting
to tax amounts which have not been reduced to possession. There is a
line of eases which hold that an employee for whom an annuity contract
has been purchased by his employer realizes taxable income in the year
of purchase though he cannot possibly realize on the contract prior to
maturity. The courts say that he has acquired a taxable "economic benefit"
or "cash equivalent" at the time of purchase?0 While in such cases, which
involve the taxation of the present value of a promise by an insurance
company to pay amounts in the future, tax has always been upheld, there
has been no instance where the present value of an employer's promise
to pay has been taxed prior to actual receipt.3a
Most authorities feel that if one of the conditions of receipt of promised
rewards is that the employee must remain in the employ of the company,
the annuity cases which involve non-forfeitable rights can be distinguished
so that there is no basis for tax prior to actual receipt.S The theory is
that future deliveries are actually earned over the entire period of service.
However, when the employee's rights become non-forfeitable, usually on
retirement, the distinction from the annuity type case becomes only one
of who is committed to make the future payments. While such a dis-
tinction might affcct the valuation of the promise to pay, the incidence of
tax, if the economic benefit theory is right, would have become fixed. In
order to avoid this result, many arrangements provide for post-retirement
conditions."0  These can, of course, not be substantial and seldom are;
otherwise the employee would just not buy the deferral. Whether or not
the government could persuade a court to disregard nominal conditions
to tax the value of a right for which no further full-time service was to be
rendered is a subject where the educated guess is even less reliable than
usual in this field.
Some arrangements are designed with the hope that tax will be fore-
stalled because the future amounts to be paid the employee are not fixed
36. Ward v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1947); Oberwinder v. Com-
missioner, 147 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1945); Renton K. Brodie, 1 T.C. 275 (1942).
See Miller v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1944) where it was held that
amounts with held from Government employees to pay for retirement annuities were
taxable income because they acquire economic benefits in the future.
37. In Frederick John Wolfe, s T.C. 689 (1947), aft'd 170 F.2d 73 (9th Cir.
1948), the fact that a corporate obligation to pay was involved was held to distinguish
the case from the single premium annuity cases. But see note, 60 YALE L.J. 169 (1951).
38. James D. Mooney, 9 T.C. 713 (1947). The fact that the condition which
would deprive the employee of the deferred compensation may be brought about only
by his own act or refusal to act should not be significant. Schaefer v. Bowers, 50
F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1931); Julian Robertson, 6 T. C. 1060 (1946); U. S. Steel Corp.,
2 T.C. 430 (1943).
39. Such conditions may include: The renditions of consulting services, General
Smelting Co., 4 T.C. 313 (1944); agreement not to engage in a competing business,
Carboloy Co., 2 T.C.M. 414 (1943). See Lourie and Cutler, Deferral Compensation
Agreements, 25 TAXES 1077 (1947); Tannenwald, Retirement Income Under Non.
Qualified Plans: Insurance and Annuities, N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAx 351 (1954).
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but are dependent on earnings or dividends of the employer in the years
when payment is due. This hope is derived from several cases which
have held that where the value of speculative stock, which was restricted
as to resale, was not ascertainable with reasonable certainty no tax would
be applied."0  However, close examination of the facts in the cases where
this broad principle was applied indicates that there was considerable
doubt whether the stock had any value at all. To rely on these cases alone
to prevent tax would ignore the real possibility that either Congress or
the courts will act to prevent avoidance of tax simply because of a difficulty
in determining value where amounts paid as compensation are of admitted
value.
II. QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS
Possibly the most convincing evidence of the impact of tax considera-
tions on compensation arrangements is found in the design of retirement
plans which have been adopted since 1942 when the Internal Revenue Code
was amended to provide for qualified pension, profit-sharing and stock
bonus plans.41 Almost every industry pension plan has been tailored to
meet the requirements of the tax law so that the employer will obtain a
tax deduction at the time of contribution under a qualified plan.' 2 The
employee is not taxed prior to the time amounts are made available
to him 43 and the trust set up under funded plans is exempt from income
taxation. 44 The most prominent feature of such plans is the requirement
that they not discriminate in benefits or contributions in favor of super-
visory or highly compensated employees. This was to give effect to the
intent of Congress in passing the law which was to encourage adoption
of pension plans benefitting large groups of employees. 45
More recently the advantages of qualified plans have been increased
40. The principle case cited in support of this theory is Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil
Co., 300 U.S. 481 (1937) which dealt with the valuation of highly speculative stock
which was restricted as to resale. See discussion in MACILL, Op. Cit. supra note 24 at
125-127; Lyons, Capital Gains Benefits Connected with Executive Retirement, N.Y.U.
12rH INST. ON FED. TAX 365, 385 (1954).
41. Prior to 1942, the law had allowed the deduction of contributions to a pension
trust for amounts which were attributable to pension liability accruing during the
year, plus not more than 10% of additional amounts. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939,
§ 23 (p). And see § 165 of the original code which exempted a stock bonus, pension
or profit-sharing trust for the exclusive benefit of "some or all employees" from the
tax imposed on trust income. See Bomar, Requirements for Qualification of Plans,
N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX 395 (1955); Lindquist, Pension and Profit-Sharing
Plans Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 33 TAxEs 30 (1955).
42. INT. REv, CODE OF 1954, § 404, See Gordon, Discrimination Problems in
the Drafting and in the Operation of Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, N.Y.U. 14TH
INST. ON FED. TAX 1153 (1956). Block, Deductibility of Employer Contributions to
Qualified Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, N.Y.U. 13TH INisr. ON FED. TAx 109 (1955).
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 402. For recent rulings setting out principles
for determining when amounts are made available to employees see Rev. Rul. 55-423,
1955-1 CUM. BULL. 41; Rev. Rul. 55-424, 1955-1 CUt. BULL. 42; Rev. Rul. 55-425,
1955-1 CuM. BULL. 43. 44. INT. REV. CODE § 501.
45. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1942).
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to allow capital gains treatment of lump sum distributions to participants. 46
This innovation has resulted in provision for lump sum distributions by
qualified pension trusts of all of an employee's credits in one year, though
retirement programs are ordinarily intended to provide lifetime benefits. A
more frequent use of the provision has been in qualified profit-sharing and
stock bonus plans which have been adopted or amended recently. The
tremendous increased popularity of employee investment or thrift plans
is believed to be directly attributable to all the advantages to be gained
from qualified trusts.
4 '
The policies of the Treasury Department are of vital concern to the
administration of these tax provisions with regard to qualified plans. To
date the Treasury has seemed to lean toward a most liberal construction
of the law insofar as a determination of the types of plans which may
qualify. For example, if a plan simply provides that all employer con-
tributions are to be made from earnings and profits, the plan will qualify
as a profit-sharing plan even though its true purpose may be to provide
for welfare benefits. 8 On the other hand, the government's position with
regard to any aspect of discrimination in benefits is often much more strict
than judicial opinion, which may have been expressed, would seem to
allow.4
9
Nevertheless, aisy compensation plan which can be effected through
the use of a qualified plan will afford benefits to employees and employers
alike which cannot be matched in any other way. First, the tax con-
sequences are predictable. The possibility that the attractiveness of a
plan will be nullified in the future by some unique Treasury position or
unusual court opinion is considerably lessened because advance rulings on
the qualification of plans can be obtained on application to the Internal
Revenue Service. "10 Secondly, employees can realize compensation at capital
gains rates. There is no other way that this may be accomplished.
Several recent rulings of the Internal Revenue Service dealing with
qualified plans should be noted. The Commissioner now holds that a
46. INT. REV. CODE 1954, § 402(a)(2). If all of an employee's share from a trust
is paid in one taxable year because of death or other separation from the employer's
service, the amount is taxable as a long-term capital gain. See Rev. Rul. 56-214, 1956
INT. REV. BULL. No. 20, at 12.
47. See General Motors Savings-Stock Purchase Program For Salaried Employees
in the United States (1955); Ford Motor Company Savings and Investment Program
(1956); Employee Savings Plan, Socony Vacuum Oil Company, Inc. (1953); The
duPont Thrift Plan (195 5). Iercules Powder Company Employee Savings Plan (19561;
General Foods Employee Savings Investment Plan (1953). The texts of the plans
referred to can be found in the reports on proxy statements of the respective companies,
which are on file for public inspection in the Securities and Exchange Commission.
48. See Special Ruling, CCIH PENSION PLAN GUIDE par. 16080 (1955) dealing
with trusts set up to provide unemployment benefits.
49. Compare i.T. 4020, 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 61 with Volckenning, Inc., 13 T.C.
723 (1949).
50. For a consideration of the effect to be given a ruling of the Commissioner
and its later revocation, see Dejay Stores, Inc. v. Ryan, 229 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1956).
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profit-sharing arrangement may qualify under section 401(a) as a profit-
sharing plan if it provides that an employee may elect (1) to take his
distributive share of the current year's profits in cash, (2) to defer it to a
future year, or (3) to take part of it in cash and defer part. 1 Examples
are provided of the operation of two plans during as pecific year with
comment on qualification. In determining whether a plan is non-discrimina-
tory, reference is made only to the employees who elect to participate in
the deferred payment trust. This means that there must be sufficient
participation each year in the deferral arrangement by the lower paid
employees if a plan is to be held not discriminatory in practice in favor
of the higher paid employees.
Another ruling of considerable interest indicates that the Commissioner
will now approve a type of plan which the courts had previously upheld
as qualified contrary to his contention. It is indicated that a profit-sharing
or stock bonus plan will be considered to qualify under the 1939 Code
even though it does not provide for a definite predetermined formula for
determining the profits to be shared.
52
The Commissioner has also ruled that a profit-sharing trust will be
considered a valid existing trust even though at the end of a particular
year its only corpus is the promise of the employer to make a contribution.
In the case considered, the promise to pay was deemed sufficient where
the employer had executed a trust agreement under seal as a part of its
profit-sharing plan, and, under local law, a promise under seal was binding
without other consideration.
A ruling of questionable validity provides that a stock bonus, pension,
or profit-sharing plan will not qualify under Section 401 (a) if the employee
has the right to elect to have all or part of his non-forfeitable interest,
which would otherwise become available to him during his lifetime, paid
to his beneficiary after deathS(a) Reliance is placed solely on an inter-
pretation of a regulatory requirement that funds be distributed to an
employee. The joint and survivor annuity contract is distinguished on the
ground that there the payment to another is only incidental.
Nor can a qualified pension plan permit participants to withdraw, prior
to severance of employment or termination of the plan, all or part of funds
accumulated on their behalf, in times of need or otherwise. 3(b) This is
held to be inconsistent with the accepted concept of a pension plan but
not necessarily of a profit-sharing plan. Qualified pension plans may provide
51. Rev. Rul. 56-497, 1956 INT. REv. BULL, No. 41, at 68.
52. Rev. Rul. 56-366, 1956 INT. REv. BULL. No. 31, at 26. Commissioner v. Pro-
duct Reporter Co., 207 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1953). The final regulations under the
1954 Code specifically eliminate the need for a pre-determined formula. U.S. Treas.
Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (2) (1952).
53. Rev. Rul. 55-640, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 231.
53(a). Rev. Rul. 56-656, Int. Rev. Bull. No. 51 at 13.
53(b). Rev. Ru!. 56-693, Int. Rev. Bull. No. 52 at .
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for disability or death benefits which are only incidental to the main purpose
of the plan.
A court holding of sone significance to corporations which maintain
both a pension and a profit-sharing or stock bonus trust should be kept
in mind. Even though the law provides for a limitation of 25% of other
compensation on contributions to two trusts,5 4 the actuarial cost limitation
for the pension trust contribution and the 15% of compensation limitation
for the other trust must be met successively where the same employees are
beneficiaries of both trusts. 55
A little publicized provision of the 1954 Code added a further incentive
to the establishment of qualified plans. The value of payments receivable
by any beneficiary (other than the executor) from an employee's trust
established under a plan which was qualified at the time of the decedent's
separation from employment, or at the time of termination of the plan,
if earlier, is excludible from gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.
The exclusion is not allowable to the extent such payments are attributable
to the decedent's own contributions. The exclusion applied only in the
case of decedent's dying after December 31, 1953."'
III. DISABILITY PLANS
One of the principal changes in the 1954 Code deals with the taxation
of disability benefits paid directly by an employer. Prior to 1954, amounts
which were received as accident and health insurance were fully exempt
from tax.57 The courts had, and are still having, considerable trouble in
deciding whether amounts paid directly by an employer constitute
"insurance." The law now provides specifically that amounts paid under
all employer financed wage continuation plans are exempt from tax up
to $100 per week. 8
The Treasury Regulations interpreting section 105 are liberal but con-
fusing in several respects. As originally promulgated, they provided that
only amounts which were attributable to a temporary period of absence
were excludible." Further, payments to retired employees were held not
to be wages or payments in lieu of wages so as to qualify for the exemption.
However, after considerable criticism by industry and insurance representa-
tives, the final regulations amended these provisions to provide that a
plan under which benefits are coninued until the employee is either able
54. rT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a) (7).
55. Parker Pen Co. v. Kuhl, 234 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1956).
56. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(c). The committee reports do not indicate
why the exclusion does not apply to amounts payable to the estate of the employee.
57. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 22(h)(5).
58. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 105. See generally Pyle, Accident and Sickness-
Insurance Under Code Sections 104, 105, 106 arid 213. 34 'AxEs 363 (1956). Com-
ment, Taxation of Employee Accident and Health Plans Before and Under the 954
Code, 64 YALE L.J. 222 (1954).
59. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 20 Fed. Reg. 1781, § 1.105-4(a) (1955).
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to return to work or reaches retirement age may constitute a wage con-
tinuation plan.60 This clearly eliminates the temporary period of absence
test. Further, the exclusion will be applicable to payments made under
a plan which provides that an employee will receive a disability pension
as long as he is disabled, except that it will not apply to payments
received after he reaches retirement age. This would seem to be a con-
tradiction in terms to some extent, since pensions are only paid to retired
emyployees, and retirement age would normally be thought to refer to
the year in which the employee retired. "Retirement age," as used in
the regulations, must refer, and in the context it is used, can only logically
refer, to the age at which the employee would have retired except for
the disability. This can, of course, mean either the compulsory or the
voluntary retirement age under the plan. If Internal Revenue takes the
position that the reference to retirement age is the earliest age at which the
employee could have voluntarily retired, then it is doubtful whether the
regulations would permit an exemption for amounts paid even to active
employees who are eligible to retire. This could not have been intended,
but a literal reading of the regulations might require that result.
It is submitted that the regulations have expanded the scope of
section 105 beyond the original intent of Congress though it is admittedly
difficult to determine with any degree of assurance what that intent was. 61
Certainly pension plans of any form are not ordinarily thought of as wage
continuation plans for employees. Indeed, pensions are paid only to
retired employees. However, the whole scheme of section 105 is difficult
to justify. The practical problems which it creates for employers may
soon be of major importance. For the tax law now places a premium on
absence from work. No employee is going to be in a hurry to give up the
weekly exemption, especially if there is any possibility of a relapse which,
under the regulations, would require another waiting period before the
exemption is applicable again. Most employers just cannot police employee's
activities to prevent malingering.
Remedial legislation is certainly indicated in the field of taxation of
disability pay or accident and health insurance, or whatever it may be
called. It is difficult to rationalize the disallowance of deduction of incurred
medical expenses, and, at the same time, exempt income received while
disabled. Removal of the limitation on the medical expense deduction or
a new exemption for medical expense reimbursements would seem to be a
much sounder theoretical approach, and would, at the same time, remove
60. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1-105-4(a)(2)(i) (1954).
61. The Senate apparently was concerned principally with equalizing the tax treat-
ment of benefits paid under a contract of insurance and those paid directly by employers.
S. REP. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1954). While this report contains a reference
to "accident or health benefits under employer pension plans," there is no other
indication that the plain language of § 105, which refers only to wage continuation
plans for employees, was meant to include former employees or pensioners.
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from the employer the responsibility for the accurate computation of his
employee's taxes which he must now assume. If the employer adjusts
withholding tax on employees' current compensation to insure that they
will obtain the benefit of the exclusion, the amount of the correct exclusion
must appear on the withholding statement and the responsibility for its
accuracy is the employer's. 2 If withholding is not adjusted, records must
still be maintained as a matter of employee relations in order that employees
will have the information to put on their tax returns.
Interpretations of the word "insurance" under prior laws are still of
current interest. The courts are pretty evenly divided in holdings that
direct disability payments by employers are insurance.13 The courts which
hold they are not apparently would require the issuance of a formal
insurance policy. There is no case which even questions the popular
arrangement of many formal industry insurance plans whereby the insurance
company simply allows the employer to draw on its drafts and charges
a percentage fee based on the amounts paid out each year by the employer.
Such plans, of course, do not involve the assumption of risk by the insurance
company, and yet payments made under such plans would be held to be
insurance for purposes of the exemption without question. The reasoning
of the courts which have held that direct disability payments made by
employers under established employee plans are, in substance, insurance
is difficult to criticize. The employees are, for all practical purposes, insured
under such plans, and the true risk of disability is assumed by the employer.
Surely allowance of the exemption was never meant to depend on the
execution of a formal insurance contract without regard to the nature of
the risks assumed by the insurer.
IV. DEATH BENEFIT PAYMENTS
Corporate payments to survivors of employees have recently been the
subject of much litigation. Taxpayers generally have argued that since no
services were rendered by the recipient, the payment constituted a non-
taxable gift even though the payor may have deducted the amount as
compensation paid. The Tax Court has ruled in a number of cases that
payments made directly to widows are gifts where there was no legally
enforceable obligation to make the payment. 4 The court has indicated
62, U.S. Treas. Reg. § 31.6051-1 (1954).
63. For cases holding that direct employer disability payments are insurance see
Epmneier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952); Pfleiderer v. United States
_... F. Supp _(D.C. Ind. 1956); Adams v. Pitts, 140 F. Supp. 618 (D.C. S.C.
1956); contra. United States v. Haynes, 233 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1956); Hanna v. United
States, _ F. Supp..(D.C. Tex. 1956); Townsend v. United States, 143 F.
Supp. 150 (D.C. 111. 1956); Cary v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 750 (D.C, Neb.
1956); Harbkersman v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 495 (D.C. Ohio 1955).
64. Elizabeth R. Mathews, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 204 (1956); Louise K.
April], 13 T.C. 707 (1949); Alice M. MacFarlane, 19 T.C. 9 (1952); Est. of Arther
W.; Helistrom, 24: T.C., 916 (1955). And see Slater v. Riddell, F. Supp., (D.C.
Cal. 1956).
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that a different result might be reached if the payment had been made
to the estate.": There has been no apparent consideration in these cases
of the possibility that the atnount paid was taxable because it was income
in respect of a decedent under the law. 6
On the corporate deduction side, the Tax Court has applied strict
standards. Where it was shown that the payment was made solely because
of the poor circumstances in which a widow was left, deduction was dis-
allowed. 7 Thus, while it is felt to be of little significance in the beneficiaries'
income cases that the payer deducted the amounts paid as compensation,
it is not unreasonable to assume that Internal Revenue may attempt to
deny a deduction to the payor in any case where the payment has been
held to be a gift to the beneficiary.
In 1951 Congress provided that amounts paid under a contract with
an employer providing for payment to the cmployee's beneficiary on his
death would be excludible from gross income to the extent of $5000 from
each employer.68 The 1954 Code eliminated the requirement that the
payment be contractual and extended the exclusion to any amounts which
are paid by reason of the death of an employee. The exclusion does not
apply to amounts which are non-forfeitable to the employee unless such
amounts are payable ii a lump sum from a qualified trust. The maximum
amount receivable tax-free is fixed at $5,000 for any one employee regardless
of the number of cmployers who may make payments.A
V. M'oviNG EXPENsE REIMBURSE*MENTS
Prior to the issuance of two recent rulings, the Internal Revenue
Service and the courts had consistently held that all employer reimburse-
ments for moving expenses were taxable income and that the expenses
were not deductible by the employces30 Late in 1954 the Commissioner
published a ruling which provides that the reimbursement for the cost
of moving an employee, his iminediate family and his personal effects from
65. See Est. of Arthur W. Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916, 920 (1955).
66. Est. of Edgar V. O'Daniel v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966 (2nd Cir. 1949); Est.
of Edward Bausch v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951).
67. W.). Haden Co., 5 CCH Ct. Mume. 250 (1946); McLaughlin Gormley King
Co., 11 T.C. 569 (1948).
68. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 22(b) (1) (B).
69. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b). It has been suggested that because of the
specific statutory exclusion for death benefit payments, the courts may be inclined to
more closely examine the gift theory where payments are made to employees' survivors.
Yohlin, Employer Payments to the Widow of a Deceased Employee, 34 TAxEs 87 (1956).
And see Mickey and Hill, Income Tax Consequences of Payments to Employee's Widow
and Relatives, N.Y.U. 12 Ann. Inst. 409 (1954).
70. See Forest W. Rice, 13 CCII '[ax Ct. Mem. 394 (1954); John Lee York v.
Commissioner, 160 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1947). Cf. Otto S. Schairer, 9 T.C. 549
(1947) where it was held that amounts paid by an employer to reimburse him for the
loss suffered on sale of a residence by a transferred employee were part of the amount
realized from the sale, and, as such, were not taxable compensation. However, amounts
paid to a transferred employee to assist him in buying a house are taxable. Rinehart,
18 T,C. 672 (1922).
TAXATION OF COMPENSATION
one place of employment to another permanent place of employment,
primarily for the benefit of the employer, is not compensatory in nature,
and is not taxable except to the extent the reimbursement exceeds actual
moving expenses incurred. However, amounts received as reimbursements
for meals and lodging of the employee and his family while awaiting
permanent quarters at the new post of duty do not constitute moving
expenses and are fully taxable. 71 A subsequent ruling provides that all
reimbursements for the expense of moving an employee's family to a
"locality where he has accepted new employment with another employer
will be includible" in taxable income of the employee."
While the first ruling represents a liberalization of former Internal
Revenue policy and the second simply continues past policy, their practical
effect will probably be that employees who previously escaped tax on
moving expenses reimbursements will now be required to pay tax on the
portion of reimbursements which are taxable. This is because employers
generally did not withhold tax on any moving expense reimbursements
because the Internal Revenue Service had issued no rulings distinguishing
reimbursements for transfer expenses from travel reimbursements on which
no withholding was required under the regulations. This did not mean,
of course, that the employees should not have included such reimbursements
in gross income, but it is probable that the great majority did not. After
issuance of these two rulings, withholding will be required on amounts
which are now held to constitute taxable income.
These two rulings will undoubtedly cause considerable confusion
because they do not contain adequate guides for interpretation. For
example, a number of problems can be encountered simply in trying to
set down a rule as to when a transferred family stops "moving" and starts
"awaiting permanent quarters." If a new residence is ready, but the
employee's furniture has not arrived, so that the family must live in a
hotel for a period of time, is the reimbursement for expense incurred
taxable or not taxable under the ruling? Obviously there will be little
uniformity in taxation of such reimbursements if problems like these
must be resolved by the person in charge of withholding procedure for
each individual employer.
CONCLUSION
This high spot account of current compensation problems with which
industry tax counsel are faced daily does not consider many of the aspects
that are always involved in any payment of compensation. A compre-
hensive discussion of each of the subtopics covered could constitute an
article by itself. It should appear, however, that tax advisers to industry
cannot confine their expertness to perfection of the tax return of a particular
71. Rev. Rul. 59-429, 1954-2 CuM. BuLL. 53.
72. Rev. Rul. 55-140, 1955-1 CUrM. BULL. 317.
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business. Tax matters arc no longer of concern only to the financial
officers. In considering methods of paying compensation, employee relations
personnel must work closely with the tax adviser because of the importance
of the tax consequences.
The necessity for accurate withholding has been responsible for this
to some extent since any deduction from an employee's pay check must
be carefully explained. Obviously, the closer concern of industry managers
for employee's problems has had some effect. If a company can save its
employees tax dollars, much good will is created. However, it is probably
the increasing complexity of the tax laws which has primarily served to
make the employees' problems with regard to tax on compensation those
of his employer. Individual employees just do not have the facilities avail-
able to keep up with the advantages or requirements of the law which
may pertain to them. For instance, how many disability retired employees
would be expected to know that after January 1, 1954, their pensions
were exempt from tax up to $100 per week. Active employees cannot
anticipate how a plan may affect them individually, and no employer can
afford to have his employees get the first bad word about a plan from the
tax collector. While various publications do an excellent job of reporting
tax matters, most employees do not have regular access to them, and must
look to the employer to keep them advised. Since the tax laws seem to
become increasingly difficult to simplify, it can be expected that this
responsibility will increase. Undoubtedly the scramble to devise compensa-
tion plans which take advantage of every feature of the tax law will
continue.
However, in attempting to improve the tax picture of the employee,
the industry tax adviser may often be faced with a situation where the
risk of additional cost to the employer is increased. For instance, deferred
compensation arrangements can prove to be very costly to an employer
if they are designed to benefit the employee fully. The tax deduction of
such amounts must be deferred to the year of actual payment. This
may result in its effective loss if there is not sufficient income to offset in
the later year. Making the amounts of such compensation dependent
on future earnings or dividends may result in their being unreasonable in
amount, and so not deductible. Of course, against these factors must be
weighed the possibility that the current use of deferred amounts in the
business will prove to be of benefit financially in years when money for
expansion is scarce.
While the employer deduction problem is associated ordinarily with
the industry tax adviser, the individual income tax problem of employees
has not been. The tax consequences attributable to new and unique
methods of paying compensation are causing a vast change in the emphasis
which must now be placed on the resulting tax to employees.
